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NOTES
RETHINKING IN PARI DELICTO:
AN ANTITRUST POLICY ANALYSIS
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Ford Administration apparently has concluded that pricefixing conspiracies contribute significantly to the inflation that plagues
the American economy., Accordingly, the Antitrust Division of the
Justice Department has launched an increasingly vigorous campaign
against those who flout the antitrust laws, with special attention to
price-fixers.2 It is common knowledge that private treble damage actionS3 usually follow on the heels of a government indictment.
Plaintiffs in private actions are by statute permitted to build a prima
facie case upon prior decisions in government-initiated suits.4 Thus

treble damage actions, which already have begun to multiply in recent years after a history of near-dormancy/ likely will continue to
increase in number.
The private treble damage action was authorized by Congress not
only to salve the wounds of the injured plaintiff, but also to supplement federal antitrust enforcement efforts. 6 The difficulty the Justice
Department had in keeping pace with the "business ingenuity" of
corporate executives, a problem that continues today,7 was to be
partially mitigated by a legion of private attorneys general." Private
actions, it was hoped, would uncover local violations and sporadic
misconduct with which the Justice Department could not contend while
focusing on problems national in scope. 9
Although many factors doubtlessly have contributed to the initially
dismal performance of treble damage plaintiffs, one obvious impediment to successful private suits has been the ancient doctrine of in
1. See Price-Fixing: Crackdown Under Way, Bus. WEEK, June 2, 1975, at 42.
2. Id.
3. Private actions for damages are authorized by § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 15 (1970).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1970).
5. One commentator notes that, on the average, there was only one successful
private treble damage action per year during the first 50 years of the Sherman
Act's existence. Lockhart, Violation of the Anti-trust Laws as a Defense in Civil Actions,
31 MINN. L. REv. 507, 570-71 (1947).
6. See Loevinger, Private Action-The Strongest Pillar of Anti-trust, 3 AN-TnTUST
BULL. 167, 168 (1958).

7.
8.
ment,
9.

See Price-Fixing: Crackdown Under Way, Bus. WEEK, June 2, 1975, at 42.
See generally Maclntyre, The Role of the Private Litigant in Anti-trust Enforce7 ANTrrRUsT BULL. 113 (1962).
Note, In Pari Delicto and Consent as Defenses in Private Antitrust Suits, 78 HARV.

L. REV. 1241 (1965).
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pari delicto. Literally meaning "of equal fault," the doctrine grew
out of the traditional equitable notion that the courts should not aid
one who is himself a wrongdoer. 10 In pari delicto first crept into the
antitrust field in 1900,11 and thereafter experienced a confused history. Generally the doctrine has been invoked to bar the claim of an
antitrust plaintiff who is himself implicated in the illegal scheme
with which he has charged the defendant.12 Not surprisingly, a treble
damage plaintiff himself often will be "tainted";1 3 it is his insider's
awareness of the defendant's illegal activities that provides the
knowledge-and evidence-upon which to construct a successful case.
The United States Supreme Court decision in Kiefer-Stewart Co.
v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons,4 which abolished the broader equitable
doctrine of "unclean hands ' ' 1 in the antitrust area, seemed by implication to eliminate in pari delicto as well. That decision was not uniformly interpreted, however, and in pari delicto often was raised successfully thereafter when the plaintiff was equally involved in or responsible for the illegal activities of the defendant." Moreover, neither
the statutory history of the Sherman Act nor that of the Clayton Act
offered consolation to those seeking to determine whether the defense
should be recognized in antitrust litigation.17 Finally, in 1968, the
Supreme Court attempted to resolve the in pari delicto controversy in
Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. InternationalParts Corp." Although that
decision specifically examined the viability of the doctrine, the result
did not measure up to the promise. The opinion is replete with ambiguity and qualification, and hence has had little effect on the lower
federal courts' application of the defense. Thus, just as before Perma
Life, most courts today continue to recognize the defense if the
plaintiff was an initiator of or willing participant in the illegal
scheme.19 Conversely, the defense usually is disallowed when the

10. See generally Comment, Limiting the Unclean Hands and In Pari Delicto Defenses in Anti-Trust Suits: An Additional Justification, 54 Nw. U.L. REV. 456 (1959).
11. The defense was first recognized in an antitrust setting in Bishop v. American
Preservers Co., 105 F. 845 (N.D. Ill. 1900).
12. See id. See also Bushby, The Unknown Quantity in Private Antitrust SuitsThe Defense of In Pari Delicto, 42 VA. L. REV. 785 (1956).
13. Bushby, supra note 12, at 785.
14. 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
15. For a discussion of this doctrine see notes 26-33 and accompanying text infra.
16. See cases discussed in Comment, supra note 10, at 458-60.
17. See Bushby, supra note 12, at 787-88. See also 47 Tax. L. REv. 322, 323 n.9
(1969).
18. 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
19. See cases discussed in text accompanying notes 75-94 infra.
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plaintiff has been "coerced" into the enterprise by a defendant with
20
superior economic bargaining power.
The continued vitality of the in pari delicto defense seems shortsighted and counterproductive. The defense should be unavailable in
antitrust litigation regardless of the plaintiff's own culpability. Total
abolition of in pari delicto would further the antitrust enforcement
objectives of the Ford Administration. This note reflects an attempt
to develop a rationale, founded on antitrust policy, for this conclusion.
After defining terms and considering Perma Life in greater detail, that
rationale will be elaborated.
II.

RELATED DEFENSES: "ILLEGALITY" AND "UNCLEAN HANDS"

At the outset it is important to distinguish the defense of in pari
delicto from two other closely related antitrust defenses: "illegality"
and "unclean hands." The defense of illegality arises when the defendant, in a non-antitrust action such as a suit for breach of contract,
interposes a plaintiff's antitrust violation as an affirmative defense.
The defendant might claim, for example, that certain contract provisions violate the antitrust laws and therefore should be held void.
The leading decision on this issue is Kelly v. Kosuga.2 1 In return for
plaintiff's promise not to deliver his entire surplus onion supply on
the futures markets, the defendant, an onion marketer, had agreed
to purchase a portion of that surplus himself. The defendant later
reneged and plaintiff filed suit. At trial the defendant argued that the
agreement had been intended to stabilize the price of onions, in
violation of the Sherman Act, and therefore was unenforceable. The
Supreme Court, while agreeing that the promise not to deliver onions
was unlawful and invalid, concluded that the defendant's promise to
buy the onions was "a lawful sale for a fair consideration"2 and would
be upheld. The Court reasoned that "[p]ast the point where the
judgment of the Court would itself be enforcing the precise conduct
made unlawful by the Act, the courts are to be guided by the overriding general policy . . . 'of preventing people from getting other
people's property for nothing when they purport to be buying it.' "23
Put another way, a defense based on a plaintiff's alleged antitrust violation will be recognized only if, by enforcing the contract, the court
24
would facilitate or align itself with a breach of the antitrust laws.
20. See id.
21. 358 U.S. 516 (1959).
22. Id. at 521.
23. Id. at 520-21, quoting Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Louis Voight & Sons Co.,
212 U.S. 227, 271 (1909) (dissenting opinion).
24. See also D. R. Wilder Mfg. Co. v. Corn Prods. Ref. Co., 236 U.S. 165, 174-
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Accordingly, the lower courts have recognized the illegality defense
only when the specific contract provision at issue is " 'infected with
illegality.' "25
The unclean hands defense could arise when the defendant in a
treble damage action charges plaintiff with an independent and unrelated violation of the antitrust laws. 26 The defense is premised on the
moral principle that the court should not aid a plaintiff who is himself
a wrongdoer. 27 Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 28 however, permanently interred this defense. The Supreme Court in KieferStewart held that the plaintiff's own independent infraction of the
antitrust laws would not foreclose its right to bring suit against defendants for their resale price-fixing activities. 29 Kiefer-Stewart laid the
foundation for the principle, later developed in Perma Life, that the
policy of encouraging private attorneys general to enforce the antitrust laws may be more compelling than the policy of denying wrongdoers access to the courts.3 0 Although one court2 ' has suggested that
unclean hands, an equitable defense, might still be available to a defendant contesting a Clayton Act injunction action, 32 Kiefer-Stewart
remains sound law today.2 2
75 (1915) (Sherman Act's express remedies may not be supplemented judicially by including avoidance of private contracts as a sanction); Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe
Co., 184 U.S. 540 (1902) (purchaser of merchandise from conspirator in alleged restraint of trade not permitted to raise that allegation in defense to action for purchase
price). Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Louis Voight & Sons Co., 212 U.S. 227 (1909), involved a successful attempt to raise the defense of illegality. The defendant in that
case had purchased materials from the plaintiff corporation, which had been established to act as a selling agent for various wallpaper companies. These companies
were doing business as a pool and were selling at allegedly excessive prices fixed through
the pooling arrangement. The Court therefore concluded that to give judgment for
the purchase price would be "to give the aid of the court in making effective the
illegal agreements that constituted the forbidden combination." 212 U.S. at 261.
25. 16N J. VON KALINOWSKI, BUSINFSS ORGANIZATIONS § 109.06, at 109-84 (1975). See,
e.g., Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Malco Petroleum Inc., 471 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (6th Cir.
1972) (tying claim could not be interposed as defense in suit on promissory note);
Denison Mines, Ltd. v. Michigan Chem. Corp., 469 F.2d 1301 (7th Cir. 1972).
26. See Comment, supra note 10, at 458-59.
27. See id. at 459.
28. 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
29. Id. at 214.
30. The Perma Life Court stated, "A more fastidious regard for the relative moral
worth of the parties would only result in seriously undermining the usefulness of the
private action as a bulwark of antitrust enforcement." 392 U.S. at 139.
31. International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. General Tel. & Electronics Corp., 296 F.
Supp. 920 (D. Hawaii 1969).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970).
33. See, e.g., Sunny Hill Farms Dairy Co. v. Kraftco Corp., 381 F. Supp. 845, 859
(E.D. Mo. 1974); Schnapps Shop, Inc. v. H.W. Wright & Co., 377 F. Supp. 570, 584 (D.
Md. 1973); Credit Bureau Reports, Inc. v. Retail Credit Co., 358 F. Supp, 780, 796 (S.D.
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Although courts sometimes confuse the defenses mentioned above
with in pari delicto3 4 there is a distinction among them that is more
than a matter of form. The decision to recognize or to bar each defense
involves different policy considerations. In each case the public interest
in enforcement of the antitrust laws must be balanced against the
"morality" of granting wrongdoers access to the courts-but the result
of that balancing may differ with regard to each defense. The illegality
defense presents the easiest case: if that defense were abolished a court
might be compelled to enforce a contract violative of the antitrust laws.
The plaintiff's suit would in no way further the interest of antitrust
enforcement; in fact, it would do exactly the opposite. It therefore
seems reasonable to retain the defense, at least as limited by Kelly
v. Kosuga.
The defense of unclean hands presents a more difficult question.
To disallow that defense is to encourage suits that do foster the objective of private antitrust enforcement. At the same time, however,
a plaintiff who himself has violated the antitrust laws-albeit in a
different manner-is permitted to invoke the judicial process. KieferStewart embodied a balancing of these competing interests, and that
balance tipped in favor of private antitrust enforcement.3
When the same balancing concept is applied it is clear that in pari
delicto raises the most troublesome question of all. Again, if the defense is barred and plaintiff is permitted to pursue his private action,
the public interest in vigorous antitrust enforcement is fostered. But
here the "enforcer" himself is a party to the very antitrust violation
for which he seeks damages from the defendant. Perhaps he is no more
Tex. 1971); Purex Corp. v. General Foods Corp., 318 F. Supp. 322, 323 (C.D. Cal. 1970);
Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 309 F. Supp. 1119, 1126 (E.D.
Va. 1970).
34. See, e.g., Moore v. Mead Serv. Co., 184 F.2d 338, 340 (10th Cir. 1950), vacated,
340 U.S. 944 (1951).
35. 340 U.S. at 211. Justice Black in his Perma Life opinion observed that both
Kiefer-Stewart and Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964), "were premised on
a recognition that the purposes of the antitrust laws are best served by insuring that
the private action will be an ever-present threat to deter anyone contemplating business
behavior in violation of the antitrust laws." 392 U.S. at 139. See Klor's, Inc. v. BroadwayHale Stores, Inc. 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S.
743, 751 (1947). See also Trebuhs Realty Co. v. News Syndicate Co., 107 F. Supp. 595
(S.D.N.Y. 1952):
"Courts of equity may . . . go much farther both to give and withhold relief
in furtherance of the public interest than they are accustomed to go when only
private interests are involved." More specifically, public policy may preclude an
application of the doctrine of "unclean hands." Whatever equities may be present
as between private litigants, they must yield to the overall public policy of the
antitrust laws to prevent monopolies and restraints of trade.
Id. at 599 (footnotes omitted).
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,'morally fit" than is the plaintiff with unclean hands; nevertheless,
the fact that his treble damage recovery would compensate an injury
arising in part from his own illegal dealing seems to taint his position
somewhat more. 36 Thus the conflict between antitrust enforcement

and denial of the courts to a wrongdoer seems even more sharply drawn.
It is not surprising, then, that most courts have expressed reservations
7
about totally abolishing the in pari delicto defense.3
In spite of these competing interests, however, the defense of in
pari delicto should be totally eliminated from antitrust litigation-regardless of the degree to which the plaintiff is implicated in the plot
with which he charges the defendant. Even where the plaintiff is as
"guilty" as the defendant, the balance should tip in favor of antitrust
enforcement; the plaintiff should be permitted to proceed unhampered
by the in pari delicto defense. This is not the conventional wisdom. 88
Nevertheless, for reasons that will be elaborated below, society would
benefit more by allowing the tainted plaintiff's suit than it would
suffer by "aiding" a wrongdoer. This conclusion will be defended
first by analyzing Perma Life and its reception in the lower federal
courts and then by questioning the rationale for the continued recognition of in pari delicto among those courts.
III. IN

PARI DELICTO: THE JUDICIAL ATrITUDE

A. The United States Supreme Court
The Supreme Court decision in Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp. 9 was prompted by a group of disenchanted
Midas Muffler franchisees. The franchise agreements provided for resale price maintenance, obligated franchisees to deal only with Midas
and required them to honor the Midas guarantee on mufflers sold by
any dealer. In return, costs of the guarantee were underwritten by
Midas, dealers were entitled to use the Midas trademark and each
was granted exclusive dealership privileges in a particular territory.
Alleging that these agreements restrained trade in violation of the
Sherman and Clayton Acts, the franchisees brought suit against Midas,

36. The Perma Life court suggested, however, that the plaintiff's "reward" be offset
by the "beneficial byproducts"-that is, those aspects of the agreement that benefited
the plaintiff should be taken into account in computing damages. 392 U.S. at 140 (1968).
37. See cases cited notes 75-94 infra.
38. Id. See also Ellis, In Defense of In Pari Delicto, 56 A.B.A.J. 346 (1970); 57 ILL.
B.J. 413, 418-19 (1969). Apparently only one commentator has suggested that a total
abolition of in pari delicto might have a beneficial effect on antitrust law enforcement.
See 47 TEx. L. REv. 322, 325-26 (1969).
39. 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
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its parent corporation International Parts, two other subsidiaries and
4
six corporate officers. 0
The district court entered summary judgment for defendants. The
Seventh Circuit reversed in part, but affirmed the lower court's determination that the Sherman and Clayton Act claims were barred because the plaintiffs were in pari delicto with defendants. 41 Because
the Seventh Circuit's decision "seemed to threaten the effectiveness
of the private action as a vital means for enforcing the antitrust policy
of the United States, " 4 2 the Supreme Court granted certiorari 43 and
reversed.4 4 Although the Court purported to abolish the in pari delicto
defense in certain antitrust actions, the scope of that abolition was
not definitively established.
1. The Opinion of the Court.-PermaLife was a plurality opinion,
prepared by Justice Black and subscribed to by only three other
Justices.45 Justice Black first noted that nothing in the language of
the antitrust laws suggested Congress' intention to incorporate the
common law in pari delicto defense into the statutory treble damage
action. 46 More persuasive, however, was the Court's own previously
articulated belief in the "inappropriateness of invoking broad common
law barriers to relief where a private suit serves important public
purposes.." 47 Black reasoned that antitrust policy objectives could best
be achieved by encouraging the private action as an "ever-present
threat" to businessmen contemplating anti-competitive activity. "The
plaintiff who reaps the reward of treble damages," Black continued,
"may be no less morally reprehensible than the defendant, but the
law encourages his suit to further the overriding public policy in favor
'8
Moreover, the "morally reprehensible" plaintiff
of competition."4
could be prevented from realizing a windfall profit, since he would
remain subject to both criminal and civil suits on the part of the
government and third parties.4 9
These public policy considerations led Justice Black to the ultimate
conclusion that "the doctrine of in pari delicto, with its complex scope,
40. Perma Life also stands for the proposition that these closely related business
entities can "conspire" to restrain trade. In other words, it is not necessary that "conspirators" be wholly separate legal entities. Id. at 141-42.
41. 376 F.2d 692, 699 (7th Cir. 1967).
42. 392 U.S. at 136.
43. 389 U.S. 1034 (1968).
44. 392 U.S. at 136.
45. Chief Justice Warren and Associate Justices Douglas and Brennan joined in
the opinion.
46. 392 U.S. at 138.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 139.
49. Id.
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contents, and effects, is not to be recognized as a defense to an antitrust action."5 Although this holding seems definitive and comprehensive, Black added several gratuitous observations arguably intended to limit its impact. For example, the holding seemed qualified by
the premise that "the plaintiff did not aggressively support and further
the monopolistic scheme as a necessary part and parcel of it . .

.-.

Additionally, Justice Black noted that the plaintiffs' participation in
the illegal enterprise "was not voluntary in any meaningful sense"
and was "thrust upon them" by Midas. 52 Most significantly, Justice
Black appended a cryptic disclaimer to his holding: "We need not
decide, however, whether ...

truly complete involvement and partici-

pation in a monopolistic scheme could ever be a basis, wholly apart
from the idea of in pari delicto, for barring a plaintiff's cause of action .... ".s The particulars of such a defense, whatever they might
be, were not elaborated. Taken literally, however, this final observation
seems to circumscribe the reach of the Court's broadly phrased holding.

54

2. The Concurring Opinions.-The ambiguity of Justice Black's
Perma Life plurality opinion is reflected in the views of Justices White,
Fortas and Marshall. Those Justices concurred in the result reached by
the plurality, but felt constrained to express certain reservations to
Justice Black's broad language. Justice White interpreted the Black
opinion to bar in pari delicto only where an illegal arrangement has
been "thrust on" the plaintiff.55 White seemed troubled by the possibility that, if in pari delicto were totally abolished, a plaintiff might be
able to recover damages for a business injury that he himself had perpetrated. Where plaintiff and defendant are equally implicated in
illegal dealing, White reasoned, recovery should be precluded since
the plaintiff would be unable to prove that defendant was "the more
substantial cause of the injury."5
Justice White's conclusion, then, was that in pari delicto should remain a sound defense when "plaintiff and defendant bear substantially
50. Id. at 140.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 139, 141.
53. Id. at 140 (emphasis added).
54. Indeed, several lower federal courts have interpreted this language to suggest
the existence of a distinguishable defense. See cases discussed notes 87-94 infra.
55. 392 U.S. at 143 (White, J., concurring).
56. Id. at 146. In other words, Justice White would, in the circumstances postulated,
increase the burden that the plaintiff must bear in proving causation. In such cases, as
Justice White himself observed, "it would be enough with respect to causation if
the defendant 'materially contributed' to plaintiff's injury, . . . or 'substantially conId. at 143-44 (citations
tributed, notwithstanding other factors contributed also,' .
omitted).
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equal responsibility for injury resulting to one of them . . . ."7 This
conclusion was premised on the belief that to allow the equally tainted
plaintiff to recover could serve as a counterdeterrent. If in pari delicto
were totally abolished such a plaintiff would be assured of illegal
profits if the plan were to succeed, and a treble damage action if it
were to fail. Therefore, abolition of in pari delicto "may encourage
what the Act was designed to prevent."5 8 This rationale has become
something of a rallying point for those who favor partial retention of
the defense.5 9
In his brief concurrence Justice Fortas endorsed the view that if
the fault of the parties is reasonably equal then in pari delicto should
bar the plaintiff's recovery. 60 Justice Fortas did not suggest whether
he, unlike Justice White, read the Black opinion to abolish the defense
in all situations, regardless of the magnitude of plaintiff's illegal conduct. Although Fortas was careful to state that he agreed "with the
result in this case,"'" he did not intimate any acceptance of the plurality
opinion. Thus one might conclude that Justice Fortas interpreted that
opinion to abolish in pari delicto entirely, and that he considered it
necessary to set forth his own contrary view.
Justice Marshall clearly interpreted the Perma Life plurality to
62
eliminate entirely the in pari delicto defense from the antitrust area.
But while Justice Marshall disagreed with Justice White to that extent,
he did reach the same conclusion that White and Fortas had embraced: "I would hold that where a defendant in a private antitrust
suit can show that the plaintiff actively participated in the formation
and implementation of an illegal scheme, and is substantially equally
at fault, the plaintiff should be barred from imposing liability on the
defendant." 61 Marshall expressed reservations about allowing a wrongdoer "to profit through his own wrongdoing" 64 and agreed with Justice
White's theory that allowing the tainted plaintiff to recover would
create a "new incentive" for potential antitrust law violators.65 Accordingly, Justice Marshall would bar in pari delicto only if the above
quoted formulation were applied.
3. Summary and Observations.-In sum, five of the nine Justices
rejected the view that in pari delicto has no place in antitrust litiga57. id. at 146.
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., Ellis, supra note 38.
60. 392 U.S. at 147 (Fortas, J., concurring in the result).
61. Id.
62. 392 U.S. at 148 (Marshall, J., concurring in the result).
63. Id. at 149.

64. Id. at 151.
65. Id.
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tion. ° Put another way, a majority of the Court would allow a tainted
plaintiff to sue his coconspirators only if he did not take part in the
7
formulation of the illegal scheme or was "coerced" into participating.
If the concurring and dissenting views are considered as a whole,
there emerge three reasons for preserving the in pari delicto defense
when an equally culpable plaintiff files suit. First, there is a disinclination to allow monetary recovery essentially for one's own acts. To
sanction a treble damage suit facilitating such recovery would be to
promote unjust enrichment. 8 Secondly, allowing the tainted plaintiff
to recover is viewed as an incentive to antitrust violations. The potential violator is provided with a "sure thing": extra profit through a
successful restraint of trade or a treble damage recovery from his coconspirator. 69 Finally, there is an apparent, albeit unspoken, revulsion
at the prospect of providing judicial aid and comfort for one who, by
his actions, has exhibited only disdain for the rule of law.70 Each of
these reasons for retaining the in pari delicto defense will shortly be
examined in some detail.
B. Perma Life in the Federal Courts: The CurrentInterpretation
The ambiguity of the Black opinion in Perma Life, along with the
alternative views expressed by the concurring Justices, has promoted
considerable difference of opinion among the lower federal courts.
The weight of authority, however, reads Perma Life to bar the in
pari delicto defense only when the plaintiff has been "coerced" to
join in an illegal endeavor by a defendant with superior bargaining
power. 71 The willing participant, on the other hand, remains vulnerable to the defense.7 2 In short, Perma Life has not appreciably affected
the judicial attitude toward in pari delicto that existed even before
the Supreme Court opinion was rendered.73
66. Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Stewart, concurred in part and dissented in
part. In Harlan's view the in pari delicto defense, if literally interpreted, "should be
permitted in antitrust cases." Id. at 153. In other words, the critical question is whether
"the plaintiffs were substantially as much responsible, and as much legally liable, as
the defendants" for the alleged restraint of trade. Id. at 156.
67. The issue of "coercion" in the context of antitrust proceedings raises special
problems of its own. See notes 132-40 and accompanying text infra.
68. For a more detailed examination of this argument see notes 108-11 and accompanying text infra.
69. For a more detailed examination of this argument see notes 101-04 and accompanying text infra.
70. For a more detailed examination of this argument see notes 105-07 and accompanying text infra.
71. See cases discussed in text accompanying notes 75-94 infra.
72. Id.
73. The pre-Perma Life attitude is represented by Crest Auto Supplies, Inc. v. Ero
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The Fourth and Seventh Circuits recently have considered the
Perma Life opinion in some detail. Both courts were influenced by
the apparent qualifications to the purportedly comprehensive ban of
in pari delicto articulated by Justice Black. 74 Additionally, in Columbia
Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co.,75 the Fourth Circuit looked to the
fact that five of the nine Justices agreed that "when parties of substantially equal economic strength mutually participate in the formulation and execution of the scheme and bear equal responsibility for
the consequent restraint of trade, each is barred from seeking treble
damages from the other." 76 In other words, when a plaintiff has
participated in a "non-coercive" agreement, the defendant may interpose the in pari delicto defense. 77 In Premier Electrical Construction
Co v. Miller-Davis Co.,78 the Seventh Circuit reached a similar conclusion, allowing a plaintiff to avoid the defense only if "economic
pressures" forced him to join the illegal scheme or he did not "bear
equal responsibility" for its formulation. 9
In a more summary fashion the Fifth and Sixth Circuits apparently
have concluded that in pari delicto does retain vitality after Perma
Life. Those conclusions, however, were expressed only by way of
dicta. In South-East Coal Co. v. Consolidation Coal Co., 0 the court
was not compelled to reach the question of whether "the type of antitrust conspiracy involved in this case falls into the category of those
antitrust conspiracies in which the defense of in pari delicto is available."': Although James v. DuBreuil12 was a rule 10(b)(5) action, the
Fifth Circuit relied on Perma Life to bar plaintiff's suit where the
fault of the parties was "clearly mutual, simultaneous, and relatively
equal."8 3 Similarly, the Second Circuit in Pearlsteinv. Scudder & German, 4 another securities case, read Perma Life only "to deny recovery

Mfg. Co., 360 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1966), Kershaw v. Kershaw Mfg. Co., 327 F.2d 1002 (5th

1
Cir. 1964), and other cases collected in 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 92 1 (1973).
74. See notes 51-54 and accompanying text supra.
75. 451 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1971).
76. Id. at 15-16.
77. Id. at 16.
78. 422 F.2d 1132 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 828 (1970).
79. Id. at 1138. See also Midway Enterprises, Inc. v. Petroleum Marketing Corp.,
375 F. Supp. 1339, 1346 (D. Md. 1974); Lanier Business Prod. v. Graymar Co., 355 F.
Supp. 524, 527 (D. Md. 1973).
80. 434 F.2d 767 (6th Cir. 1970).
81. Id. at 784.
82. 500 F.2d 155 (5th Cir. 1974).
83. Id. at 160. But see Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 705-06 (5th Cir.
1969) (Godbold, J., dissenting).
84. 429 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1970).
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to plaintiffs who had not been coerced but who had benefited from
".5
the arrangement equally with the defendant ....
Several courts have disallowed a plaintiff's suit by focusing on
Justice Black's reference to "truly complete involvement" in an illegal
scheme "wholly apart from" in pari delicto.8 6 Effectively, of course,
there is no difference between a defense based upon such involvement
and in pari delicto. Regardless of the terminology employed, the
plaintiff's recovery is barred because he was as responsible for the
illegal enterprise as was the defendant. No court of appeals has yet
embraced this "wholly apart from" view,

7

but it has been recognized

Third, 9 Fourth, 0 and Ninth Cirby district courts in the
91
cuits. Dobbins v. Kawasaki Motors Corp.92 is perhaps the best
example of this approach. It is worth reemphasizing, however, that
Justice Black did not recognize such "total involvement" as a defense
to a treble damage action; he merely declined to rule on the question
one way or the other.9 3 It should be added at this point that any purported "total involvement" defense is equally as objectionable as the
defense of in pari delicto. The policy reasons supporting abolition of
the latter9 4 are equally applicable to nonrecognition of the former.
Finally, one smaller group of courts has opted for the expansive
interpretation of Perma Life, totally eliminating the in pari delicto
defense. Several district courts have made the bald statement that
the defense is completely abolished after Perma Life. 5 Two decisions
from the Tenth Circuit, Semke v. Enid Automobile Dealers AssociaSecond, s8

85. Id. at 1141. The court, however, did not apply this Perma Life rule to the
facts before it. Id. See also Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. American Broad. Cos.,
501 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1974).
86. See text accompanying notes 53-54 supra.
87. But see El Salto, S.A. v. PSG Co., 444 F.2d 477, 481 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 940 (1971).
88. Skouras Theaters Corp. v. Radio-Keith-Orpheum Corp., 58 F.R.D. 357, 360
(S.DN.Y. 1973).
89. American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1073, 1098 (D.N.J.
1973).
90. Lanier Business Prod. v. Graymar Co., 355 F. Supp. 524, 527 (D. Md. 1973).
91. Dobbins v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., 362 F. Supp. 54, 62-63 (D. Ore. 1973).
92. Id. The plaintiff in Dobbins enjoyed an exclusive sales territory under the terms
of his agreement with the defendant supplier. At trial the defendant raised the in pari
delicto defense on the basis of that exclusive territory; plaintiff moved for summary judgment, citing Perma Life. The court denied plaintiff's motion, concluding that "the defense of plaintiffs' complete participation and involvement in the alleged monopolistic
Id. at 64.
scheme . . . exists, although not as the defense of in pari delicto .
93. 392 U.S. at 140.
94. See discussion at pp. 372-81 infra.
95. Schokbeton Prod. Corp. v. Exposaic Ind., Inc., 308 F. Supp. 1366, 1369 (N.D. Ga.
1969); Morton v. National Dairy Prod. Corp., 287 F. Supp. 753, 765 (E.D. Pa. 1968), afl'd,
414 F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1006 (1970).
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tion 9 6 and Sahm v. V-1 Oil Co., 9 7 are in accord. In neither decision,
however, was the court actually required to consider whether plaintiff's
equal responsibility in the illegality charged should alter its conclusion. Semke was actually an unclean hands case. 98 Sahm involved a
plaintiff with less bargaining power than the defendant, the classic
situation in which the majority of courts find a "coercive" agreement. 9
Thus, on the facts of Sahm, even those courts favoring the restricted
view of Perma Life (i.e., partially retaining the defense) would have
allowed plaintiff to proceed.
To summarize, only a few opinions have suggested that in pari
delicto will never again be recognized after Perma Life. Most have
interpreted the Supreme Court opinion to bar in pari delicto only
in cases involving coercion, or have adopted the plaintiff's total involvement in an illegal scheme as an alternative defense. The minority
view, however, is the better law. The most serious shortcoming with
those few decisions that have totally abolished in pari delicto is that
no policy supporting that conclusion has been put forward. Given
the prevailing view that the defense should at least partially be retained, the minority position is likely to remain exactly that unless
some persuasive arguments are mustered on its behalf. The remainder
of this note is directed to that end.
IV.

SOME POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

The three basic arguments supporting continued recognition of in
pari delicto when a plaintiff has been a willing participant in an
illegal scheme have already been summarized. 100 Those arguments
now will be considered in greater detail. The objective is twofold: to
demonstrate that those arguments are unpersuasive and to suggest
that continued recognition of in pari delicto is counterproductive in
terms of antitrust enforcement policy.
The contention that toleration of a tainted plaintiff's treble damage
action actually encourages antitrust violations, articulated by several
Justices in Perma Life, 1°1 draws further support from a variety of
commentators." 2 The argument is premised on the belief that a
96. 456 F.2d 1361 (10th Cir. 1972).
97. 402 F.2d 69 (10th Cir. 1968).
98. Plaintiff in Semke was not implicated in the same illegal conduct with which
he charged defendants; rather, he was charged with violating a separate state licensing
statute. 456 F.2d at 1364-65.
99. Plaintiff was a lessee of defendant, a large oil company. 402 F.2d at 70.
100. See text accompanying notes 68-70 supra.
101. 392 U.S. at 146 (White, J., concurring); 392 U.S. at 151 (Marshall, J., concurring).
102. See, e.g., Ellis, supra note 38, at 358; Comment, supra note 10, at 461.
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businessman will be less inclined to join an illegal conspiracy if he
realizes a future treble damage action against his coconspirators will
be barred by in pari delicto. This conclusion, however, seems to misconceive the motivation of the culpable plaintiff. Moreover, it seeks to
deter at a time when such deterrence is likely to be ineffective. Although the question is not susceptible of empirical proof, it seems
unrealistic to argue that a potential conspirator, contemplating illegal
business dealings, seriously considers whether legal redress from his
coconspirators will be available should the enterprise fail. 03 Rather,
it is more likely that he agrees to cooperate only after he is convinced
that the scheme will not fail. This is the only rational course of behavior since the consequences, should the illegality be exposed, are
too great to risk. Exposure almost certainly would prompt Justice Department investigation and possibly criminal charges. Even greater
danger is posed by the threat of costly treble damage actions likely to
follow on the heels of such an investigation. Shareholders would be
angered and, depending upon the magnitude of the scandal, might
even stir from their customary lethargy to press for changes in
management. Additionally, the public image of the corporation, as
well as its stock market performance, likely would suffer. Finally, and
as unlikely as it may seem in a society that does not punish white
collar crime, those at the highest echelons of the corporate structure
10
might wind up in the slammer.

4

In the face of these less than appealing consequences it seems inconceivable that any reasonable corporate executive conspires to violate
the antitrust laws unless he is absolutely convinced that the conspiracy
will escape detection and succeed. That being the case, it is specious
to suggest that the future availability of a treble damage action against
his coconspirators will in any way influence the decision to join in an
illegal agreement. And if that influence is nonexistent, there is no
substance to the argument that allowing defendants to raise in pari
delicto against equally culpable plaintiffs will discourage those plaintiffs
Cf. Note, In Pari Delicto and Consent as Defenses in Private Antitrust Suits,
L. REV. 1241, 1244 (1965).
104. Prison sentences for offenders of the antitrust laws, though still infrequent, are
increasing in number. Of the 46 executives sent to prison under the Sherman Act,
27 were sentenced during the last four years. Price-Fixing: Crackdown Under Way, Bus.
WEEK, June 2, 1975, at 48. Moreover, with the recent passage of the Antitrust Penalties
and Procedures Act, Pub. L. No. 93-528, 88 Stat. 1706 (Dec. 21, 1974) (codified in
scattered sections of 15, 47, 49 U.S.C.A.), Congress has upped the ante for potential
antitrust law offenders. The new statute provides for corporate fines of up to $1
million. It makes violation of the antitrust laws a felony, and subjects individual
offenders to prison terms of up to three years and fines of up to $100,000. See Keeffe,
What Hath ITT Wrought: A New Poker Game?, 61 A.B.A.J. 877 (1975).
103.

78
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from violating the antitrust laws. Conversely, and contrary to majority
thinking, total abolition of in pari delicto would not further encourage antitrust lawbreaking by making the treble damage action
available to the willing participant turned plaintiff. The decision
to break the law will have been prompted by the perceived certainty
of success, not by the future availability of suit.
The second argument advanced in support of the in pari delicto
defense-that the courts should not aid a wrongdoer-seems equally
unpersuasive. Both courts and commentators have expressed distaste
for granting the "morally undeserving" 10 5 plaintiff access to the judicial
system. When this attitude is applied to the area of antitrust law enforcement, however, a question of priorities necessarily arises: two
competing interests are drawn into sharp conflict. If the "purity" of
the judicial system is accorded higher priority-that is, if the courts
will not deign to "help" the errant plaintiff by striking the in pari
delicto defense-then antitrust enforcement must remain of secondary
importance. On the other hand, if vigorous enforcement of the antitrust laws is assigned a higher priority, we are compelled to put aside
questions of the plaintiff's own "immorality"; his suit must be forborne by disallowing in pari delicto, regardless of his personal transgressions.
From a policy standpoint the latter course seems more desirable.
What does society really gain, aside from some vague feeling of selfrighteousness, by barring the culpable plaintiff's suit through recognition of the in pari delicto defense? Such "punishment" of the wrongdoer serves only to preclude exposure and prosecution of a defendant
whose illegal acts might otherwise go unchecked. By sanctioning the
defense, therefore, society effectively punishes itself as well as the
tainted plaintiff. Moreover, even if he is able to avoid the "punishment" of in pari delicto, the plaintiff remains vulnerable to Justice
Department prosecution and third party treble damage actions-a
more effective punishment than disallowance of a plaintiff's own suit,
and one that will not promote continued immunization of defendant's
activities.
In short, sound antitrust enforcement policy dictates that we put
aside any aversion for "aiding a wrongdoer" and recognize that it is
to society's benefit to allow the culpable plaintiff's suit. The Supreme
Court already has taken a step in that direction by abolishing the
°
unclean hands defense in Kiefer-Stewart.10
That decision clearly em105. Note, supra note 103, at 1244. See also 392 U.S. at 151-52 (Marshall, J., concurring); 392 U.S. at 154 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting).
106. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951). See
discussion of the "unclean hands" defense at notes 26-33 and accompanying text supra.
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bodies the principle that enforcement of the antitrust laws should
have priority over barring the unworthy plaintiff's recovery. The Court
in Kiefer-Stewart observed that the "unclean" plaintiff still may be
punished by defendant's counterclaim or by an independent action' 7a principle which, as previously noted, is equally applicable to the
plaintiff who is in pari delicto with the defendant.
A third and closely related equitable argument against total abolition of in pari delicto is that the culpable plaintiff should not be permitted to enrich himself unjustly through a treble damage action
against his coconspirators. Abolition of in pari delicto, opined Justice
Harlan, "rests upon the principle of well-compensated dishonor among
thieves."' 0 8 A nationally recognized authority on the antitrust laws
has concluded: "There exists no reason to afford such a [culpable]
plaintiff the windfall of treble damages while at the same time permitting him to retain the fruits of his conduct. To allow the plaintiff
a right of recovery under these circumstances would be detrimental to
the efficient enforcement of the antitrust laws and contrary to the
underlying policy of those laws."' 10 9
On the contrary, to disallow recovery under such circumstances
would be detrimental to the efficient enforcement of the antitrust laws.
The culpable plaintiff is indeed "unjustly enriched," but at whose
expense? If he succeeds at trial it is not society but another guilty
party who is compelled to provide him his "unjust" riches. Society
pays nothing, and meanwhile those riches may be diminished by
defendant's counterclaim and by treble damage actions initiated by
third parties." 0 Moreover, society is saved the unnecessary expense
of a tax-supported Justice Department investigation and prosecution,
as well as the incalculable indirect cost of a perpetuated conspiracy.,"
In short, before concluding that the plaintiff's unjust enrichment should
be foreclosed, it should be recognized that his suit will cost society
nothing and at the same time will provide substantial benefits.
The reluctance to see a wrongdoer profit from his illegal scheming
is reflected in the settled principle that only damages occurring after
107. 340 U.S. at 214.
108. 392 U.S. at 154 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting).
109. 16N J. VON KALINOWSKI, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 109.02, at 109-30 (1975).
110. Additionally, Justice Black suggested in Perma Life that the "beneficial byproducts" of plaintiff's agreement with defendant be taken into account in computing
damages. 392 U.S. at 140. In other words, the value of those provisions of the agreement
favorable to the plaintiff should be offset against the recovery. See also The Supreme
Court, 1967 Term, 82 HARV. L. REV. 63, 265-66 (1968).
111. One government witness in a recent price-fixing prosecution claimed that
15% of the increase in the price of bread was traceable to the illegal conspiracy. PriceFixing: Crackdown Under Way, Bus. WEEK, June 2, 1975, at 42,
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his withdrawal from the conspiracy are recoverable. 112 This rule indeed
precludes unjust enrichment, but seems undesirable from a policy
standpoint. When one party withdraws from a conspiracy he increases
the likelihood that the agreement will collapse. The other conspirators
rightfully will fear that their former cohort intends to sue for damages,
publicizing the entire affair. The threat of Justice Department prosecution and independent treble damage actions suddenly will seem
quite real. Additionally, astute antitrust counsel will advise that the
departed conspirator will be unable to recover damages if he is not
injured by the conspiracy after his withdrawal. Thus there will be
intense pressure on the remaining conspirators to terminate their arrangement. 113
Unfortunately, under the prevailing rule governing damages, such
pressure might not be brought to bear. Since a conspiracy is likely to
terminate upon the withdrawal of one conspirator there will be little
reason for him to withdraw; recovery for damages sustained during the
conspiracy period will be foreclosed, and he will be unable to show
injury after his withdrawal and the agreement's subsequent collapse.114
Therefore plaintiff would be better advised to remain a participant
in the illegal enterprise and hope illegal profits will increase, than to
withdraw and seek a treble damage recovery. There is no point in
filing suit if recovery will be unavailable and, at the same time, the
plaintiff himself will be exposed to prosecution. In other words, by
allowing recovery for damages that accrue only after withdrawal from
a conspiracy, perpetuation of that conspiracy is encouraged. This seems
a high price to pay in order to ensure that the tainted plaintiff will
not be unjustly enriched-particularly when, as previously noted, that
enrichment may be offset by counterclaim or by independent suits.
To this point an attempt has been made to refute the principal
arguments advanced in support of in pari delicto. Hopefully, this
discussion has revealed certain weaknesses in those arguments. But
the case against in pari delicto is even stronger. There are a variety
of other troublesome aspects to the defense that point to the need for
its total abolition, regardless of the degree of a plaintiff's "guilt."
To begin, it seems counterproductive to recognize a procedural
device that will bar the suit of that party in the best position to ex112. Note, supra note 103, at 1244. See also Connecticut Importing Co. v. Frankfort
Distilleries, 101 F.2d 79, 81 (2d Cir. 1939); Victor Talking Mach. Co. v. Kemeny, 271
F. 810, 816 (3d Cir. 1921).
113. Cf. The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 HARV. L. REV. 63, 265 (1968).
114. Sometimes a conspirator will have little choice but to withdraw from the agreement. Here, however, we are considering the motivation of a conspirator who is not yet
experiencing monumental losses and who therefore needs some incentive to withdraw.

1975]

IN PARI DELICTO

pose and prove a violation of the law. The equally culpable plaintiff
presumably helped formulate the conspiracy; he will be able to relate
the words and actions of those involved, and probably will possess
documentary evidence to bolster his case. Proof of an "agreement,"
the basic prerequisite to a Sherman Act section 1 charge, 11 5 often is no

easy matter."' How much more readily might collusion be established
if an actual party to the agreement were to introduce the necessary
proof.' 7 On the other hand, by prohibiting the plaintiff's suit through
in pari delicto this considerable burden of proof is imposed on the
Justice Department" 8 (at taxpayer expense, of course) or on third
parties, both less intimately familiar with the conspiracy. The likely
result is fewer and less efficient prosecutions.
As with the "no recovery before withdrawal" rule,"19 continued
recognition of in pari delicto is likely to encourage the perpetuation of
restraints of trade. Assume two mutually powerful steel producers agree
voluntarily to fix prices in a given area. The agreement does not
succeed as planned; the parties misjudge the scope of the market and
a third, more distant producer is able to undercut the fixed price even
when additional transportation costs are taken into account. Consequently the conspirators begin to lose sales and profits. One conspirator,
however, is part of a larger conglomerate; his losses are of no immediate concern as they can be offset by profits elsewhere. That conspirator wants to hold firm. He reasons that the third party does not
have access to a sufficient supply of raw material to satisfy all customers indefinitely, and therefore the price fixers ultimately will succeed.
The other conspirator, however, is in a more precarious situation. He
is unable to absorb losses for any significant length of time and already
has lost more than he can afford. He would like to withdraw from the
agreement and, a firm believer in the survival of the fittest, contemplates
suit against his "partner" ("he lured me into it, anyway") to recover
those losses.
This hypothetical situation is not at all improbable. If a conspiracy begins to falter, it is unlikely that all participants will suffer
equal losses and will be disposed to terminate the agreement at the
115. The Sherman Act, § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970), states: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade . . . is
declared to be illegal .... "
116. See generally Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346
U.S. 537 (1954); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
117. 53 MINN. L. REV. 827, 834 (1969). See also Note, supra note 103, at 1243.
118. It might be added that, in addition to expense, political considerations may
in some instances influence the Justice Department's inclination to proceed with an
investigation and/or prosecution.
119. See notes 112-13 and accompanying text supra.
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same time. Therefore one is likely to be more inclined to sue than
are the others.
It was suggested previously that the unavailability of future suit
is not likely to deter the party about to enter into an illegal agreement.120 Because of the serious risk of adverse publicity, Justice Department prosecution and private treble damage actions, he will join
the conspiracy only if he is convinced it will succeed. Thus he will be
unconcerned that in pari delicto may foreclose a future treble damage
action against his coconspirators. But if the conspiracy already has
been implemented, and it has failed to produce the expected results,
a different situation obtains. Then our hypothetical conspirator may
be faced with monumental losses; he may need desperately to terminate
the agreement and to recover some of that loss. The fear of Justice
Department and third party actions may then be less compelling, as
it will be neutralized by the already realized damage of lost sales and,
depending on the size of the business, perhaps the possibility of its
total demise. The conspirator in this position may have no alternative
but to bring suit; his continued solvency may depend upon a treble
damage recovery.
But given the prevailing view regarding in pari delicto, the party
in this unenviable situation may be barred from suit. Since he was
a willing participant in the first place, his coconspirator would have
a sound defense. Thus a party who otherwise might file suit, exposing
and terminating the agreement, is instead faced with only two alternatives: to withdraw quietly and hope that business will improve, or
to acquiesce in the agreement and hope that future illegal profits will
offset present misery. There would be no incentive for the damaged
party to expose the illegality. His own treble damage action would
be barred by in pari delicto and such exposure might only subject
him to prosecution. This result is hardly promotive of antitrust enforcement policy. The conspiracy is likely to go undetected and the
public unprotected.
On the other hand, this result, unfortunate for both society and the
injured party, could be eliminated if in pari delicto were totally
abolished. Then our oppressed conspirator would enjoy a more palatable alternative: a treble damage action against his coconspirator regardless of his own involvement in the illegality. This alternative
would serve society as well, since the suit would expose the conspiracy,
leaving the other conspirators accountable both to the Justice Department and to others they have defrauded. And the plaintiff himself

120.

See notes 101-04 and accompanying

text supra.
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would remain vulnerable to suit for his own wrongdoing.1 2 ' Therefore antitrust enforcement policy again points to nonrecognition of
the in pari delicto defense.
Some commentators have suggested that total abolition of in pari
delicto would in fact serve no purpose, since a culpable plaintiff would
not bring suit for fear of exposing his own complicity. 122 As already
suggested, any reluctance to sue should be overcome by the intense
pressure to which a conspirator faced with monumental losses is subjected. There is ample empirical evidence to support this conclusion.
A variety of treble damage actions have been initiated, since Perma
Life, by plaintiffs equally implicated in the illegal activity with which
they charged defendants. 12 3 Apparently these plaintiffs were not deterred by the fact that they almost certainly would expose their own
complicity by filing suit. So the evidence suggests that a culpable party
will be inclined to hazard the risk of exposing his own illegal conductat least if his treble damage recovery is not barred by in pari delicto.
There is still another troublesome aspect of the view that the
equally guilty plaintiff should be unable to recover treble damages.
Only the vaguest guidelines exist by which to determine when plaintiff's guilt reaches the level that will support a successful in pari delicto
defense. The concurring Justices in Perma Life articulated the basic
test in several ways: that plaintiff's "delictum" is "par";124 that plaintiff
is "substantially equally at fault";1 25 that plaintiff's own conduct is
the most substantial cause of injury. 26 While these formulations may
seem clear enough, difficulty arises in determining exactly what constitutes equality of guilt. Justice White, finding "little mystery" in
what evidence would be relevant, suggested that a court look to
facts as to the relative responsibility for originating, negotiating,
and implementing the scheme; evidence as to who might reasonably
have been expected to benefit from the provision or conduct making
the scheme illegal under §1; proof of whether one party attempted
to terminate the arrangement and encountered resistence or countermeasures from the other; facts showing who ultimately profited or
27
suffered from the arrangement.:
121. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968).
122. See, e.g., Note, supra note 103, at 1244.
123. Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., 451 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1971); Premier
Elec. Constr. Co. v. Miller-Davis Co., 422 F.2d 1132 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 828
(1970); American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1073 (D.N.J.
1973).
124. 392 U.S. at 147 (Fortas, J., concurring).
125. Id. at 149 (Marshall, J., concurring).
126. Id. at 146 (White, J., concurring).
127. Id. at 146-47.
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Such considerations obviously will raise complicated factual issues in
determining whether in pari delicto is appropriate. In Premier
Electrical Construction Co. v. Miller-Davis Co., 1 28 for example, the
plaintiff and defendant willingly agreed to a mutually beneficial arrangement; nonetheless, the Seventh Circuit remanded the case for
an assessment of the bargaining power of each and a determination
of who actually had initiated the agreement. 12 9 Similar factual determinations have been required in other circuits.2 0
Because the guidelines for determining equality of guilt are so
open-ended and imprecise, substantial irregularity of treatment is likely to result. And the probability of such disuniformity raises additional questions about the theory supporting retention of in pari delicto.
According to that theory, availability of the defense will deter potential
conspirators because their coequal guilt will bar future treble damage
recoveries. 1 31 Yet, if the plaintiff must await a complex factual inquiry at trial to determine whether his recovery is barred, that deterrent effect is subverted. The situation is somewhat analogous to informing a purveyor of filth that if he continues to disseminate his salacious material he may be convicted of selling pornography-but we're
not sure yet because we won't know what pornography is until we consider that question at trial. A deterrent is of little effect unless it is
evenly and certainly applied. The nature of the in pari delicto defense
precludes any certainty of application, which substantially subverts its
purported deterrent value.
Effective antitrust enforcement policy should provide even the
culpable plaintiff with every conceivable incentive to expose the misdeeds of his partners in crime. Hopefully, the foregoing has suggested
that even a limited retention of in pari delicto undermines that incentive and provides little compensating benefit to society. Comprehensive antitrust law enforcement would more likely be achieved by a
total elimination of the defense. A primary goal of the antitrust laws
should be to induce mutual paronoia among competing businessmen. Much as the Ku Klux Klan views every new recruit as a potential
FBI informer, conspirators in restraint of trade should be encouraged
to suspect that each of their number might become a treble damage
claimant, armed with intimate knowledge of their illegal scheming.

128. 422 F.2d 1132 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 828 (1970).
129. Id. at 1138-39.
130. See, e.g., Midway Enterprises, Inc. v. Petroleum Marketing Corp., 375 F. Supp.
1339 (D. Md. 1974); Skouras Theatres Corp. v. Radio-Keith Orpheum Corp., 58 F.R.D.
357 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
131. See pp. 372-73 supra.
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The result should be fewer conspiracies and swifter termination of
those that already exist.
V. A COMMENT ON "COERCION"

Central to the issue of whether a plaintiff's recovery will be barred
by in pari delicto is the degree of willingness he exhibited in joining
the illegal agreement. Most courts have framed this issue with reference
to "coercion"; the determinative question is whether plaintiff effectively was "forced" to participate by a party with superior economic bargaining power. 3 2 In the context of antitrust proceedings determination
of coercion has become increasingly liberal. Apparently a party now
is able to establish coercion by arguing that, had he refused to cooperate, he would have lost a profitable business opportunity. 13 3 The
traditional view of economic coercion, however, has been considerably
more strict. The Supreme Court at an early date concluded that to
prove coercion "there must be evidence of some probable consequences . . . to person or property for which the remedy afforded by
the courts is inadequate.""s4 More recently another court, summarizing
the judicial attitude toward coercion, concluded that it is necessary
to establish, inter alia, that the coerced party was deprived of his free
will, that no alternative course of action was available and that the
threatened consequences were such that the remedy at law was insufficient." 5 The culpable plaintiff in an antitrust action usually should
be unable to sustain the burden of showing coercion in this traditional
sense, since a reasonable alternative or adequate remedy at law should
be available. In Perma Life, for example, the plaintiffs might have
sought to enjoin enforcement of the objectionable franchise agree-

ments. 1 6 But the courts' inclination to focus on "economic pressure"
or on the defendant's "superior bargaining power' ' 131 suggests that, in

the context of in pari delicto, a different approach to the coercion
question is appropriate."38
132. See, e.g., Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., 451 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1971);
Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. Miller-Davis Co., 422 F.2d 1132 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 828 (1970).
133.

See The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82

HARV.

L. REV. 63, 263

(1968)

(dis-

cussing Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964)). See also Mandeville Island
Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948).
134. Hartsville Oil Mill v. United States, 271 U.S. 43, 49 (1926) (emphasis added).
135. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 245 F. Supp. 889 (N.D.
Ill. 1965).
136. Private injunctive relief is provided by § 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 26 (1970).
137. See cases cited note 132 supra.
138. Indeed, there is substantial case law reflecting the more liberal approach to
the coercion issue when the defendant has raised the defense of in pari delicto. Generally
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It should be noted that although a "coerced" plaintiff is able to
avoid the in pari delicto defense, he still is amenable to criminal prosecution and to independent treble damage actions. 139 The initial finding
of coercion does not afford him subsequent immunity. This all seems
a bit odd. First we say that the plaintiff had no effective choice but
to join the illegal scheme. Then, in a separate action, we prosecute
him for his participation. This anomalous result is compelled by the
majority view favoring retention of in pari delicto. Some method must
be found for distinguishing "overly guilty" plaintiffs, whose recovery
will be barred by the defense, from less culpable plaintiffs who will
be permitted to proceed. Invocation of the increasingly artificial coercion rationale is viewed as a defensible means of effecting this distinction. Notice that if the defense were totally abolished no such
hairsplitting would be necessary.
Subsequent prosecution of the coerced plaintiff perhaps may be
justified on the theory that, just as the wrongdoing defendant should
not be shielded by in pari delicto, the wrongdoing plaintiff should not
escape accountability for his own misdeeds. Put another way, because
of the harm he has done to society the culpable plaintiff should not be
accorded the same advantage (that is, the ability to plead "coercion")
in his own prosecution that he enjoys when he brings suit against
another culpable party.
However one may rationalize that result, it is less easy to justify
the inequity accorded a plaintiff who is deemed a willing participant,
and hence is unable to avoid the in pari delicto defense. It is established law that the unwilling participant in an illegal enterprise
is just as guilty as one who cooperates enthusiastically: "acquiescence
in an illegal scheme is as much a violation of the Sherman Act as the
creation and promotion of one.' 1 41 On principle it seems inequitable
to provide one party with a procedural advantage denied to another
if, in the eyes of the law, both are equally guilty of a substantive offense.
Again, complete abolition of in pari delicto would eliminate this contradiction.

this "coercion" exception to the defense has been recognized when the plaintiff stood
to lose his business investment if he had not joined in the illegal scheme, see Ring v.
'Spina, 148 F.2d 647 (2d Cir. 1945), or if he could have lost his source of supply by refusing to cooperate, see Eastman-Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S.
359, 377 (1927); see also Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co.,
334 U.S. 219 (1948). As suggested above, notes 132-33 and accompanying text supra, the
coercion exception to in pari delicto apparently now has become even easier to satisfy.
139. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968).
140. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 161 (1948).

1975]

IN PARI DELICTO

VI. CONCLUSION

It appears that most courts recognize the advantages of encouraging former conspirators to expose the misdeeds of their compatriots
through private treble damage actions. At the same time, however,
those courts apparently are reluctant to facilitate windfall profits for
a wrongdoer. The tension created by these conflicting interests has
given rise to the prevailing judicial attitude toward in pari delicto. By
recognizing the defense when the "equally guilty" plaintiff brings
suit, and by disallowing it when the "coerced" plaintiff files his action,
the courts have attempted to find a middle ground. The coerced
plaintiff somehow seems less tainted; thus his recovery seems less
offensive to one's sense of propriety. Unfortunately, while this result
may salve the judicial conscience, it does little to foster vigorous enforcement of the antitrust laws. Effective antitrust policy should seek
to create a healthy mistrust among competitors, and that objective
could be furthered by a total abolition of in pari delicto. In short,
those courts that continue to recognize in pari delicto should reexamine
their position from an antitrust policy standpoint. Society derives
little if any benefit from recognition of the defense, and its existence
inhibits antitrust law enforcement to a substantial degree.
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